Katsina State, Nigeria, is struggling with a relentless banditry crisis that has devastated rural communities through kidnappings, cattle rustling, and violent raids. In an attempt to restore stability, community leaders across several local government areas have taken a controversial step: opening dialogue with armed groups. Though backed cautiously by the state government, these grassroots initiatives remain community-driven and have become central to the fight against violence. Governor Dikko Umar Radda admitted in May 2025 that 26 of Katsina’s 34 local government areas are still affected by insecurity, underscoring the severity of the situation. Humanitarian agencies add that hundreds of thousands have been displaced across Katsina and neighbouring states, with farmer–herder clashes and bandit attacks driving the crisis.
The European Union Agency for Asylum reported as early as 2020 that 21 LGAs in Katsina were experiencing regular attacks, ranging from abductions to cattle theft and raids. In response, the government created the Community Watch Corps, a grassroots security outfit designed to complement the work of the police and military. While the initiative has generated cautious optimism, debates continue over whether community-based solutions can succeed where military campaigns have failed.
The peace efforts took a dramatic turn in September 2025 when notorious bandit leader Isiya Kwashen Garwa, long wanted by Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters, unexpectedly agreed to a local peace deal. Garwa, from Kamfanin Daudawa in Faskari LGA, shocked many by releasing 28 abducted victims on 18 September after meetings with traditional rulers and clerics. Reports indicated no ransom was paid, and local authorities hailed the gesture as a signal that dialogue might reduce violence.
State officials have stressed that these talks are not government-led but community-driven. Traditional rulers, village heads, and religious leaders have spearheaded discussions, while the state provides support without taking direct leadership, to avoid legitimising bandit groups. The Commissioner for Internal Security explained that underdevelopment—long highlighted as a grievance by armed groups—is central to these conversations. Indeed, bandit leaders have tabled specific demands, including the construction of schools, hospitals, and grazing reserves. Such requests have surfaced in dialogues across LGAs like Dan Musa, Jibia, Batsari, and Safana, areas that have endured some of the worst attacks.
Reactions remain divided. Many residents doubt the sincerity of leaders like Garwa, pointing to previous peace deals that collapsed. Still, Governor Radda has credited these “locally made” efforts with easing tensions in some high-risk areas. “We are not negotiating directly; we are supporting communities to find solutions,” he said. Official data from the Katsina State Emergency Management Agency shows that more than 100,000 people were displaced by banditry between 2020 and 2024, highlighting the urgency of such initiatives.
At the same time, Katsina has not abandoned military action. The government has combined dialogue with ongoing counter-insurgency operations. In June 2025, the Nigerian Army secured the surrender of several gang leaders in Dan Musa LGA, leading to the release of 16 hostages in a disarmament deal. Similar “peace accords” have since been reported in Jibia, Batsari, Safana, Danmusa, and Kurfi. In August 2025, airstrikes near Kankara freed 76 hostages, underscoring the continued reliance on force alongside dialogue.
Despite these developments, the scale of the crisis remains daunting. Banditry, once confined to five LGAs between 2011 and 2015, had spread to about 25 LGAs by 2023. The human toll is heavy: in June 2024, at least 50 people were killed in Yargoje village (Kankara LGA) during a large raid, while the same month in Maidabino (Danmusa LGA), about 100 people were abducted and seven killed.
Public opinion reflects the national divide over the talks. In Abuja, Joseph, a resident, condemned the move: “This thing that the community leaders are doing is very wrong. Sitting down with terrorists to negotiate is wrong. When you know this person is a terrorist, you go there and arrest the person and put him in jail.” Emmanuel Hassan shared the same concern: “My view on the community leaders bargaining with bandits is wrong. Because there’s nothing you can do to please these people. We must confront them. By bargaining with them, you are encouraging them.” Yet others see potential. Ibrahim, another resident, said: “From my own view, I don’t see anything wrong. It’s for the community leaders and the bandits to come together, discuss the problem, and find solutions to it, then they stay in peace. I don’t see anything wrong.”
Such divergent views echo the broader debate across Nigeria. Advocates of dialogue argue that it addresses root causes like poverty, poor infrastructure, and lack of grazing land. Critics insist that talks embolden criminals, pointing to past amnesty programmes that collapsed after concessions failed or promises were broken.
Recent developments have also raised concerns about sustainability. A Premium Times investigation confirmed that Garwa personally attended peace talks in Faskari, accompanied by armed men, unsettling locals. Similarly, during talks in Matazu LGA on 20 September, residents told Sahara Reporters they felt uneasy as bandits arrived armed, casting doubt on their sincerity. Reports also confirmed that demands for schools, hospitals, and grazing reserves were presented during negotiations. Officials maintain that these projects will be integrated into broader community development, not handed out as direct concessions. Security analysts warn, however, that peace deals in Zamfara that offered concessions without credible disarmament temporarily reduced attacks but later collapsed, emboldening groups further.
The cost of insecurity continues to weigh heavily on ordinary lives. A UNICEF-commissioned study by Oxford Policy Management in 2025 found that Katsina, Zamfara, and Niger States have suffered widespread school closures due to violence. In Katsina alone, more than 330 students and 15 staff were abducted between 2020 and 2025, while 52 schools in Batsari, Faskari, and Kankara LGAs shut down. The disruptions to education and livelihoods reveal the depth of the crisis.
For now, Katsina’s strategy of blending community dialogue with selective military action represents a pragmatic response to a problem that has defied military force alone. Yet analysts caution that its success will depend on genuine disarmament, fulfillment of development pledges, and justice for victims. Without these, many fear the peace talks could collapse like earlier agreements between 2016 and 2020.
The question remains: can Katsina turn fragile truces into lasting peace, or will it once again slide back into cycles of violence?
