The legal battle between Kogi Central Senator Natasha Hadiza Akpoti-Uduaghan and Senate President Godswill Akpabio has escalated dramatically at Nigeria’s apex court, with the embattled legislator filing a counter-affidavit that not only opposes Akpabio’s latest motion but fundamentally challenges the procedural legitimacy of his appeal itself.
Court documents filed at the Supreme Court reveal that Akpoti-Uduaghan has mounted a vigorous defence against Akpabio’s Motion on Notice, dated January 21, 2026, contending that the Senate President’s latest legal manoeuvre represents both a procedurally defective appeal and an improper attempt to circumvent an ongoing appellate process. The counter-affidavit, marked SC/CV/1111/2025 and deposed to by a Senior Legislative Aide to the senator, systematically dismantles the substantive and procedural foundations of Akpabio’s position.
The respondents—Akpoti-Uduaghan and her legal representatives—have called upon the Supreme Court to “dismiss the application,” characterising it as fundamentally “lacking merit and an abuse of court process.” This language reflects a direct challenge not merely to the merits of Akpabio’s case but to the appropriateness of his bringing the matter before the Supreme Court at all, given the procedural stage at which the case currently stands.
At the heart of the dispute lies a question of appellate procedure and judicial propriety. The counter-affidavit emphasises that the Court of Appeal had concluded hearing in the substantive appeal on November 28, 2025, and had reserved the matter for judgment. This procedural posture—a court having heard arguments and reserved for judgment—is critical because it establishes that the appeal process was not incomplete but rather concluded, awaiting only the appellate court’s pronouncement of its decision.
Under this circumstance, the respondents argue, approaching the Supreme Court at this particular juncture amounts to an improper attempt to interfere with an ongoing appellate process. The underlying logic is that the Court of Appeal, having received full arguments and reserved the matter, should be permitted to deliver its judgment without parallel proceedings initiated at a higher court seeking to disrupt or preempt that judgment.
“The Court of Appeal had concluded hearing in the substantive appeal on November 28, 2025, and reserved the matter for judgment,” the counter-affidavit states, adding that such an approach “amounted to an attempt to interfere with an ongoing appellate process.”
The counter-affidavit further asserts that Akpabio was afforded comprehensive opportunity to present his case at the Court of Appeal level, and that Akpoti-Uduaghan’s brief of argument was properly filed and never subjected to any procedural challenge from the Senate President’s legal team.
However, the respondents contend that significant procedural violations characterised Akpabio’s own conduct before the Court of Appeal. Specifically, they allege that while other parties complied with the 35-page limit prescribed by the Court of Appeal Rules, 2021—a mandatory requirement designed to ensure manageable case dockets and equal treatment of all parties—Akpabio’s brief substantially exceeded this prescribed limit and was not regularised within the time allowed by the appellate court.
This procedural breach proved consequential: the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to decline admission of the oversized brief, a decision the respondents characterise as a lawful exercise of the court’s authority to maintain procedural discipline.
The counter-affidavit further contends that Akpabio’s grounds of appeal raised issues of mixed law and fact without prior leave of court, rendering the entire appeal incompetent and incapable of progressing. This argument strikes at a fundamental principle of appellate procedure: certain categories of appeals require prior authorisation from the court before they may be pursued, and failure to obtain such leave renders the appeal itself defective.
Akpabio’s position has apparently included assertions that he was denied fair hearing before the Court of Appeal. The respondents robustly reject this characterisation, arguing instead that the Court of Appeal exercised its discretionary authority judicially and in accordance with established appellate procedure.
In urging the Supreme Court to reject Akpabio’s application and “throw out the application as an attempt to delay judgment,” the counter-affidavit frames the latest Supreme Court motion as something far more troubling than merely a disagreement over a lower court’s decision—characterising it as a deliberate strategy to postpone an adverse judgment and obstruct the appellate process itself.
The case before the Supreme Court must be understood within the context of a far broader institutional and constitutional dispute that has unfolded over months, encompassing questions about parliamentary discipline, the boundaries of senatorial authority, individual rights, and the proper role of Nigeria’s judicial system in restraining legislative action.
The entire matter originates from a dramatic plenary session in February 2025 during which the Senate, acting on a recommendation from the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges and Public Petitions, suspended Akpoti-Uduaghan from her legislative duties. The recommendation and subsequent action followed what has been characterised as a disciplinary matter within the Senate itself, though the precise nature of the underlying charges has not been extensively detailed in public disclosures.
Akpoti-Uduaghan, rather than accepting the suspension as a matter of internal parliamentary discipline, immediately sought relief in the courts, initiating proceedings at the Federal High Court in Abuja to challenge the constitutionality and legality of the Senate’s action against her.
On July 4, 2025, the Federal High Court delivered what amounted to a stinging rebuke to the Senate’s disciplinary action. The court found that the suspension imposed on Akpoti-Uduaghan was excessive and unconstitutional, a judgment that fundamentally vindicated her position that the Senate had exceeded its authority in imposing the penalty.
This ruling represented not merely a technical victory but a profound institutional statement: the judiciary was asserting that even the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria—one of the country’s most powerful institutions—operates within constitutional limits and cannot act with unfettered discretion in disciplining its members.
The legal implications of the Federal High Court’s decision were substantial. It established, at minimum, that legislative bodies possess disciplinary authority over their members but that such authority is not infinite or unconstrained; it is bounded by constitutional principles including due process, proportionality, and the right to fair hearing.
Remarkably, despite Akpoti-Uduaghan having completed the six-month suspension period—meaning that the practical effect of the Senate’s disciplinary action had already expired by the time courts began intervening—the legal battle has continued unabated. This unusual persistence of litigation long after the matter’s practical resolution speaks to deeper institutional questions at stake.
Akpabio, as Senate President, has pursued continued legal remedy by seeking leave to appeal the Federal High Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal, and subsequently attempting to involve the Supreme Court through the motion now opposed by the respondents. These efforts suggest that for Akpabio and the Senate’s institutional interests, vindicating the disciplinary action through higher courts has become a matter of principle—perhaps concerning the boundaries of executive legislative authority or the proper relationship between the judiciary and the legislative branch.
Akpoti-Uduaghan, for her part, has maintained consistent legal positions throughout: that the suspension was unlawful from its inception, that the disciplinary process violated her right to fair hearing, and that the Federal High Court’s judgment should be upheld and defended against any appeals seeking to reverse it.
The dispute touches upon fundamental questions about institutional separation of powers within Nigeria’s constitutional framework. Legislatures worldwide possess some degree of internal disciplinary authority—the power to maintain order, enforce rules of conduct, and sanction members who violate legislative protocols or engage in misconduct.
Yet such authority, even when constitutionally recognised, exists within bounds established by higher constitutional principles. No branch of government in a constitutional democracy operates with unlimited discretion, and the principle of judicial review ensures that even legislative actions may be examined for conformity with constitutional requirements.
The Federal High Court’s finding that the Senate’s suspension of Akpoti-Uduaghan was “excessive and unconstitutional” implicitly established that the Senate had crossed these boundaries—that whatever authority it possessed to discipline members did not extend to the particular action it took against Akpoti-Uduaghan.
What remains to be seen is how the Supreme Court will address the procedural objections raised in Akpoti-Uduaghan’s counter-affidavit. The court must determine whether Akpabio’s motion should proceed to the merits stage or whether it should be dismissed on procedural grounds—the oversized brief, the lack of leave of court for the grounds of appeal, and the procedurally irregular intervention at a point when the Court of Appeal had already completed hearing and reserved judgment.
If the Supreme Court accepts the respondents’ procedural objections and dismisses the motion, the Federal High Court’s decision condemning the Senate’s suspension would stand unchallenged at the appellate level. If the court permits the motion to proceed to substantive consideration, Nigeria’s highest judicial institution would then grapple with the deeper constitutional questions about legislative discipline, fair procedure, and the limits of parliamentary authority.
The case has already consumed considerable judicial time and institutional attention across multiple courts. Its resolution will likely provide important clarification about the constitutional boundaries of legislative disciplinary power and the circumstances under which the judiciary will intervene in internal parliamentary matters.
The chronology of events reveals a matter that, while initiated in February 2025, has remained unresolved for nearly a year. The Federal High Court’s July decision provided what many might have expected to be the case’s resolution. Yet Akpabio’s subsequent appeals suggest that the institutional interests at stake—whether the Senate’s authority, the interpretation of its disciplinary powers, or institutional prestige—have motivated continued litigation despite the practical expiration of the suspension itself.
The recent filing of Akpabio’s Motion on Notice on January 21, 2026, demonstrates that the matter remains actively pursued, and Akpoti-Uduaghan’s swift response through the counter-affidavit indicates her determination to resist what she characterises as improper attempts to override earlier judicial findings.
The Supreme Court’s response to the current pleadings will be closely observed not merely for its resolution of the specific dispute between Akpabio and Akpoti-Uduaghan but for what it signals about the judiciary’s approach to legislative discipline, procedural regularity at higher courts, and the proper relationship between Nigeria’s coordinate institutions of government.
